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MEDICAL ERROR VERSUS
MALPRACTICE*
Marshall B. Kapp, J.D., M..H.*

On the January 23, 1997, edition of the popular WNBC medical television
series ER, a patient with Type 0 blood died after a nurse mistakenly
transfused him with a bag of Type A platelets. The fictional attending
physician advised the nurse not to worry about the matter, since the
patient was "bleeding out anyway." The nurse replied, "We've saved
worse." Continuing to dismiss any proximate causal link' between the
nurse's error and the patient's death, the physician told the nurse directly,
"If you choose not to file an incident report in this case, we will all
support that decision." The nurse accepted this implied but obvious
invitation to attempt to avoid legal entanglements stemming from her
mistaken action, but observed, "I'll still have to look at myself in the
mirror."
Errors have always been a part of real medical practice. 2 Physicians
are quick to admit that, "When we touch something, we put it at risk." As
one experienced clinician has observed, "Error free patient care is the ideal

*Thefinancial support of the Greenwall Foundation in the preparation of this article is gratefully

actowledged. A version of this article was presented at the Annual Conference of the American
College of Legal Medicine, Fort Lauderdale, FL (Mar. 6, 1997). All opinions, of course, are those
of the authors unless otherwise specified. The author also thanks the numerous physicians and

other professionals Whom he interviewed for this project but whom considerations of
confidentiality prevent him from identifying here.

-Professor, Departments of Community Health and Psychiatry and Director, Office of Geriatric
Medicine & Gerontology, Wright State University School of Medicine; Member of the Adjunct
Faculty, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., Johns Hopkins, 1971; J.D., George

Washington University Law School, 1974; M.P.H., Harvard University, 1978.
'Proximate causation is an essential element of proof in any negligence action, including
those based on an allegation of medical malpractice. See MARCIA MOBILIABOUT.IIL & CLIFFORD
.E. ELiAS, THE LAW OF MEDiCAL LIABILrrY INANuTSHELL 115-127 (1995).
'The classic sociological study of physician errors is CHARLES L. BOS!, FORGIVE AND
REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAILuRE(1979).
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While the existence of this

phenomenon has been acknowledged for some time, error remains a
significant, recurring problem in terms of patient safety and welfare.4
Physicians' pervasive, and often erroneously or even irrationally
based anxiety about medical malpractice litigation and liability' -- and

their consequent defensive behavior toward patients 6 -- often acts as a
barrier to effective individual and collective strategies for preventing and
reducing medical errors. This article describes and analyzes the ways in

which physician apprehension about potential involuntary involvement
with the civil justice system7 affect professional practices toward patients

in a manner that negatively interferes with attempts to make errors in
medical practice less common or to keep them from occurrng altogether.
Additionally, potential educational and public policy strategies are

'Carlo Fonseka, To Err WasFatal,313 BRIT. MED. J. 1640, 1640 (1996).
4
See MARILYN SUE BOBNER, HUMAN ERROR INMEDICINE (1994); Lucian L. Leap, Error
in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851 (1994); David Hilfiker, Facing OurMistakes, 310 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 118 (1984); Alvan R. Feinstein, System, Supervision, Standards, and the 'Epidemic' of
Negligent MedicalErrors,157 ARCH. INTERN. MED.1285; Timothy S. Lesar et al, MedicationPrescribingErrorsin a TeachingHospial, 157 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1569 (1997).
5
See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians'Point of View ConcerningMedical
Malpractice: A SociologicalPerspective on the Symbolic Importance of 'Tort Reform,' 23 GA. L
REV. 295 (1989). Although physicians' anxieties about the law's intrusion into medical practice
is an international phenomenon, see, e.g., HARVEY TEFF, REASONABLE CARE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DOCTOR/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (1994) (describing these anxieties from
a British perspective), this article concentrates on the current situation in the United States.
6
See Nathan Hershey, The Defensive PracticeofMedicine: Myth or Reality? 50 MILBANK
MEM. FUND Q. 96 (1972); Laurence R. Tancredi & Jeremiah A. Barondes3, The Problem of
Defensive Medicine, 200 SCIENCE 879 (1978). For analyses that are skeptical that physicians
really alter their conduct in caring for patients specifically because of legal fcars, see, e.g., U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE, OTA-H-602 (July 1994).
'Physicians also are concerned about potential criminal or regulatory liability exposure.
See, e.g., GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 84-123(6th
ed. 1996) (chapter on "Criminal Aspects of Health Care"); Alexander McCall Smith, Criminalor
Merely Human? The Prosecution ofNegligentDoctors, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 131
(1995); Einaugler v. Supreme Court, 918 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Green v. Abrams, 984
F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1993);People v. Anyakora, 616 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1993); People v. Klvana,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1992); State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991);
People v. Protopappas, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1988); Paople v. Coe, 501
N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1986), affld5lO N.Y.S.2d 470 (App. Div. 1987), affid, 522 N.E.2d 1039
(N.Y. 1988); State v. Brenner, 486 So. 2d 101 (La. 1986); State v. Serebin, 350 N.W.2d 65 (Wis.
1984); Commonwealth v. Youngkin, 427 A.2d 1356 (Pa. 1981); People v. Ketclum, 358 N.Y.S.2d
353 (App. Div. 1974). This article, however, concentrates primarily on anxiet es about tort suits
based on negligence, i.e., professional liability/medical malpractice claims.
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presented toward mitigating or overcoming the various barriers that
defensive medicine poses to the kinds of positive, ethical (i.e., benevolent
and non-maleficent) medical practice that is associated with a reduction
or elimination of medical errors.
The following discussion builds on a project in which the author
investigated, in depth, the phenomenon of defensive medicine,
concentrating particularly on the influence of physician apprehension
about litigation and legal liability on the conduct of ethical medical
practice. Qualitative data9 were derived from a substantial number of
personal interviews with academic and practicing physicians who are
knowledgeable about, and interested in, the implications of defensive
medicine for the ethical practice of medicine. The population of
interviewees was diverse in terms of professional specialization,
geographical location, and length of experience. A small group of
attorneys, ethicists, and risk managers were also interviewed.
In "Definitions" of this article, the term "error" is very briefly
examined, showing that the perceptions of different parties to the
discussion 0 may establish contrasting - or at least imprecise - frames of
reference. "Culture of Infallibility" specifically dissects physician
perceptions regarding how medicine should be practiced and, especially,
what it means to the physician when something goes seriously wrong.
Physicians' notions about the adverse legal implications of medical errors
are the subject of Legal Fears and Deceptive Behavior, as well as a look
at the ways in which those worries influence patient care decisions and
actions. The legal beliefs that drive physician behavior in certain
directions are compared with the actual state of the law in this area.
Finally, "Solutions and Initiatives" will discuss possible initiatives for
effectively addressing the medical errors problem are outlined.
DEFINITIONS

"See generallyEDMUND PFLEGRINO & DAVIE THOmASMiA, ForTHE PATI-N'S GOOD: THE
RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE INHEALTH CARE (198S).

'For a good description and example of qualitative research in a related area, see Sharon
Kaufman, Decision Making, Responsibility, and Advocacy in GeriatricMedicine Physician
Dilemmas With Elderly in the Community, 35 GERoNT. 481 (1995).
"Cf J. Douglas Peters et al.,An EmpiricalAnalysisof th Medical andLegal Professions'
ExperiencesandPerceptionsofMedical and LegalMalpractice, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REFOr. 601

(1986).
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"Error" in medicine is a difficult concept to delineate precisely in the
context of analyzing the law's role as a contributing, or exacerbating
factor. The standard dictionary definition of error is "an act, assertion, or
belief that unintentionally deviates from what is correct, right, or true; the
act or an instance of deviation from the accepted code of behavior;
transgression; wrongdoing; mistake."" In the medical arena, we are
concerned with error as an act; assertions and beliefs are relevant only to
the extent that they lead directly to some action taken toward a patient.
The concept also entails actions that are omitted or withheld from a patient
improperly. Beyond these general guidelines, though, medicine has no
officially sanctioned or exact definition of error, and the working ideas
held by individual physicians on this subject vary widely.Z
In the law, "error" is defined quite technically according to the
specific factual context. The 1996 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part of
WORDS AND PHRASES' 3 provides seven fine print pages of annotations for
various types of errors with legal significance. In addition, this standard
resource contains cross-references to fifty-five other sections carrying an
"Error" label, ranging alphabetically from "Administrative Error" to
"Waiver of Such Error." The annotation most directly pertinent to the
subject matter of this article states:
The words "mistake, ".error"and "negligence" in policies insuring
...
against liability for injuries to hospital patients because of
malpractice, error, mistake, or negligence mean more than
"malpractice," which is failure of one charged therewith to exercise
ordinary diligence, care and skill of members of his profe;sion, as
a physician or hospital may err or make mistake without
necessarily being guilty of malpractice. 4
Thus, it appears that in both medicine and law, error and negligence
are not synonymous. Beyond this point, however, consensus within and
between the two professions about this cloudy concept does not exist.

"THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcnoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 445 (W. MoRRIs

ed.

1976).

12Cf.A.R. Localio et al., IdentifyingAdverse Events Causedby Medical Care: Degree of
Physician Agreement in a Retrospective Chart Review, 125 ANN. INTERN. MED. 457 (1996)

(finding substantial disagreement among physicians on the causes of adverse patient outcomes),
315 WORDs AND PHRASES 69-76 (Supp. 1996).

'41d. at 71 (citing Bums v. American Casualty Co. 269 P.2d 656, 659 3 Cir. (1954)).
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THE "CULTURE OF INFALLIBILITY":
HOW PHYSICIANS PERCEIVE ERRORS

Tort standards require that physicians provide reasonable care under the
circumstances, as judged against the level of knowledge and skill

exercised by their professional peers. 5 A mere "error in judgment" is not
the basis for finding liability. 6 By contrast, most physicians impose a
considerably higher standard on themselves and their colleagues: namely,
perfection.1 7 Physicians are professionally socialized into a "culture of
infallibility,"18 in which errors in patient care are not truly result from poor

training or technique. Instead, errors are seen as manifestations of
unacceptable character flaws, and they include not just discrete misdeeds
or "sentinel events," but also the failure to treat a patient according to the
ideal state of the art prevailing at the time. This may help explain why
many physicians understand risks and benefits - medical as 9well as legal
-- only in absolute, rather than relative or statistical, terms.'

In light of this perfectionist mentality, being accused in a public
forum, such as a court, of committing an error by an external scrunitizer
cannot be interpreted by the physician in any manner other than as a
deeply personal affront.20 One physician has explained this orientation by
stating: "[u]pon being served with a summons, the initial reaction is one
of benumbed disbelief followed by self-deprecating analysis, schooled as
"5On the tort standard of care for medical negligence, see,e.g., Alan C. Hoffman, Mcdieal
Malpractice,in LEGAL MEDICINE 129, 132 (American College of Legal Medicine, ed., 3d ed.
1995) ("[m]edical negligence is medical care that falls below the established standard of care
expected of physicians."); BouMIL & ELIAS, supra note 1,at 24; DOUGLAS A. HAs:GS El AL.,
NAT'L HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 136 (1995) C[n]egligence is
generally defined as doing-or failing to do-that which a reasonable physician ...
in the same
specialty, would have done in the same circumstances.").
16Bou MIL & ELIAS, supra note 1, at 36.
"7Louis Snyder, DisclosureofErrorsand the Threat ofMalpractice,in ETHICAL CHOICES:
CASE STUDIES FORMEDICAL PRACTICE 47, 51 (Louis Snyder, ed. 1996). According to one study,
in a profession that values perfection, error is virtually forbidden. Marc Newman, The Emotional
Impact ofMistakes on Family.Physicians,5 ARCH. FAM. MED. 71 (1996). Sce Dennis H. Novack
et al., Calibratingthe Physician: PersonalAwareness andEffctive PaticntCare,278 JAMA 502,
505 (1997).
SLevy, Code Blue, 7 HARV. PUB. HEALTH REV. 36,39 (1995).
'9See Mark A. Davis, M.D., et al., Admission Decisionsin Emergency Department Chest
PainPatientsat Low Risk for MyocardialInfarction: Patient Versus PhysicianPreferences,28
ANNALS EMERG. MED. 606, 609 (1996) (referring to "training biases resulting in avoidance of
error rather than analysis of net benefit.")
2
OLeape, supra note 4, at 1851.
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the physician is in the pursuit of excellence, then feelings of inadequacy,
and, finally, anger, frustration, and a tremendous sense of isolation. 2
Physicians also ordinarily do a worse job than juries or judges in
distinguishing between honest misjudgments (the currently popular term
is "mispractice")2 2 and negligent errors (i.e., malpractice). This often blurs
blameworthy deviation from acceptable professional standards and
blameless misfortune or bad luck. 23 Even in situations in which
physicians would not be held to be at fault legally, physicians tend to
envision themselves as lifeguards upon whose shift no one should be
allowed to drown. The fact that he or she has complied with scientific
evidence and reasoning rarely assuages the physician's guilty feelings,
induced by a disastrously bad clinical result or the embarrassment ("losing
face"), occasioned when such a result is called to the attention of one's
professional peers.
Physicians can never be psychologically immunized against their
own feelings; professionalism does not mean a suspension of emotions
and self-doubt. With or without the added pressures of anticipated legal
system intrusion, errors associated with seriously deleterious patient
outcomes are "etched indelibly" in the physician's mind.24 Some
physicians make mistakes from which they never fully recover
emotionally, and almost all physicians exercise some sense of
introspection amounting to psychological torment by rehashing errors
multiple times within their own mind.25 Physicians take undesirable26
outcomes to heart and crave a reaffirmation of personal competence,
seeking the ability to sleep well at night again.
Reflecting on his early experience with a patient who had died from
undiagnosed tetanus, a physician stated:

2

'Lycurgus M. Davey, M.D., The Hidden Costs ofMalpractice,54 CONN. MED. 209, 210

(1990).
22

PETER .H. BERCZELLER, M.D., DOCTORS AND PATIENTS: WHAT WE FEEL ABOUT YOU

213-217 (1994).
supra note 2, at 24.
nBOSK,
24
1d., at 40.
sAlbert W. Wu, M.D., et al., How House Officers Cope With Their Mistakes, 159 J. GEN.
INTERN. MED. 566-67 (1993).
26MARY-Jo DELVECCHIO, GOOD AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE QUEST FOR COMPETENCE

(1995); BERCZELLER, supra note 22, at 216-17; Hilfiker, supra note 4.
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I think that I never came to terms with [this patient]'s death. I
suspect that his death must have been a strong influence that
subconsciously drove me out of clinical medicine into a preclinical
department like physiology, where in those days [the early 1960s]
you killed only frogs.27
The fact that the author of this cathartic passage is from Sri Lanka
illustrates that the potentially devastating psychological ramifications of
error to the physician are inherent in medicine and universal in
distribution, and not some artifact of the unique American legal system.
LEGAL FEARS AND DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOR:
PERCEPTIONS VERSUS REALITY
Physicians' Legal Perceptions
Physicians and patients alike are harmed when physicians attempt to
disguise their errors (whether negligent or blameless) from patients,
medical colleagues, and other third parties. Thus, it is essential to tease
out the explanation(s) underlying such physician behavior.
Physicians instinctively, and virtually universally believe that the
current tort system punishes medical errors, and does so aggressively.
Consequently, physicians maintain they are too intimidated by fear of
adverse legal repercussions to admit their mistakes out loud; instead, the
legal incentives are perceived as pushing physicians strongly in the
direction of covering up their errors.28 According to one commentator,
Those who are associated with errors are the most likely people to
be able to provide information about what contributes to the errors.
There is an impediment to their providing information, however,
which is fear of malpractice litigation. Most medical care
providers in the United States will not provide error-related
information because to do so might be construed as admitting

27

Fonseka, supranote 3, at 1640.
2sLevy, supra note 17; Leonard D. Marks, Letter. Admitting Mistakes, 26 AlNALS EMERO.
MED. 758, 758 (1995), Leape, supranote 4; LW. Senders, Afedical Devices, Afcdi cal Errors,and
MedicalAccidents,in HtmAN E ERRORIN MEDIcNE 159, 171 (Marilyn Sue Bogner, cd. 1994).
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responsibility for any error under consideration. This could lead
to litigation. 9

Renowned Harvard surgeon emeritus, Dr. Francis D. Moore, has
described hospital mortality and morbidity (M & M) conferences as
essential to continuing medical education and correcting errors. He
laments, however, the fact that physicians now feel that honestly
discussing with their colleagues things that have gone wrong in patient
care puts them at intolerable risk legally."
Another Harvard medical professor, Dr. Lucian Leape, charges:
We have difficulty dealing with error. We punish with a
malpractice suit instead of solving the problem. By suing doctors,
we create a monster. Perfect performance is not possible. But
punishment is counter-productive, inappropriate and inefficient."

Ethical Principles and Legal Realities
Hiding or rationalizing, rather than acknowledging, medical errors is
ethically harmful at least three reasons. First, it interferes with the
desirable process of turning errors into educational "treasures"32 from
which both erring physicians and their colleagues might learn and grow
professionally. Second, it hurts patients by depriving them and their
physicians of information that could potentially be valuable in correcting
33
errors and otherwise improving treatment of present and future patients.

29

Marilyn Sue Bogner, Human Errorin Medicine: A Frontierfor Change, in HUMAN
ERROR IN MEDICINE 373, 379 (Marilyn Sue Bogner, ed. 1994).
3FRANcis D. MOORE, M.D., A MIRICALE AND A PRIVILEGE: RECOUNTING AHALF CENTURY
OF SURGICAL ADVANCE 91 (1995).
"Diverse GroupsAgree: Unified, InnovativeApproach is Best Way to Minimize or Prevent
Health Care Errors, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR (Nov. 15, 1996) at 1, 2 [hereinafter Diverse
Groups].
2
David Blumenthal, Making MedicalErrorsinto 'Medical Treasures,' 272 JAMA 1867,
1867 (1994); see Charles Vincent, Risk, Safety, andthe Dark Side of Quality, 314 BRIT.MED. J.
1775 (1997).
3
Michael D. Fetters, Letter, Errorin Medicine, 274 JAMA 457,458(1995); see also David
Casarett & Lainie F. Ross, Overriding a Patient'sRefusal of Treatment After an Iatrogenic
Complication, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1908, 1909 (1997) ("[i]n seeking to urkdo complications
[caused by physician error], physicians may need to perform additional procedures and provide
additional therapies, each of which has its own benefits and risks. The occurrence of an iatrogcnic
complication does not give physicians the right to perform these interventions without the patient's
consent.").
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This offends the principles of beneficence (i.e., doing good) and nonmaleficence (i.e., preventing harm).3 a Patients' families may also be
cheated. For instance, fear of uncovering errors that might lead to

litigation probably assists in accounting for a decrease in the number of
autopsies performed today,35 thereby diminishing many opportunities for

physicians to learn,3 6 to comfort families with explanations of the patient's
death, and to alert families of discovered genetic risks. 37 Finally,
purposeful deception undercuts and attacks the essential fabric of the

fiduciary or trust nature of the physician/patient relationship
by directly
33
violating the ethical principle of fidelity or truthfulness.

Like many of the other legal perceptions commonly held by
physicians about malpractice exposure,39 the notion that defensively

covering up medical errors must be good risk management is highly
questionable. Paradoxically, such a strategy is probably legally
counterproductive.4 There is credible evidence that most patients want
their physicians to admit medical errors - both large and seemingly minor

-- to them, and that complying with the patient's preference may reduce
mSee PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note S.
"'The declining interest in autopsies" may be explained in part by the videspread physician
perception that, "For the clinician, the autopsy may produce embarrassment and p.-rhaps a legal
liability." Hartmann H. R. Friederici, M.D., TurningAutopsy LiabilitiesInto.Asscts, 250 JAMA.
1165, 1165 (1983).
6
On autopsy as a learning opportunity, see, eg., Marten Boers, M.D., Tie Prospectsof
Autopsy: Mortui Vivos Docuerunt? ("Have the Dead Taught the Living? "), S6 A,. J. MED. 322
(1989); Stephen A. Geller, Autopsy, Scd. AMt., Mar. 1983, at 124.
3"A forensic pathologist has vaitten, "Are physicians, in their paranoia about lawyers and
the civil justice system, actually hurting themselves by deliberately refraining from obtaining
permission for postmortem examinations when an unanticipated and seemingly ine'-plicable death
of a patient occurs?" Cyril Wecht, Medical Malpractice Suits andAutopsies, 266 JAMA 360,
360-61 (1991). Another physician replied, "physicians should not be asked to order autopsies to
defend their own interest. While autopsies certainly may be used to justify a physician's actions
in a medical malpractice lawsuit, it is a fact that the outcomes of such autopsies are also used to
initiate these lawsuits." Adam 0. Goldstein, Medical MalpracticeSuits and Autopsics, 266 JAMA
360, 361 (1991); see also Martin J. Valaske, M.D., Loss ControlRiskManagement, A1Surwey of
the ContributionofAutopsy Examination, 108 ARCH. PATHOL. LAB. MED. 462 (1984) (results
support author's bias for increased use of autopsy information for risk management).
8
See Jean H. Ritchie & Sally C. Davies, ProfessionalNegligence. A Duty of Candid
Disclosure?,310 BRTI. MED. J. 888 (1995).
"9 See, e-g., A.J. Rosoff, Commentary Truce on the Battlefield: A Proposalfora Different
Approach to Medical Informed Consent, 22 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 314 (1994); Alan Meisel, J.D.
& Mark Kuczewski, Ph.D., Legal andEthicalMyihsAboutInformed Consent, 156 ACH. INT'N.
MED. 2521 (1996).
4
See Ritchie & Davies, supra note 38.
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rather than multiply the physician's risk of punitive actions. While readily
admitting mistakes may inspire some malpractice suits, significantly more
legal claims are likely to result because a physician conceals an error that
the patient subsequently suspects or discovers through other means."
Thus, a patient who is under the impression that the physician has been
less than candid about an iatrogenic error will more likely bring a
malpractice action based on that suspicion or knowledge in the event of
an unfavorable clinical outcome, especially if the bad result was an
unpleasant surprise.
Dr. Albert Wu of the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene
and Public Health contends:
Physicians have an obligation to disclose clear mistakes that cause
significant harm that is remediable, mitigable or compensable ...
Disclosure can reduce litigation, if patients appreciate the
physician's honesty and can appreciate that physicians are fallible.
Serious mistakes may come to light, even if the physician does not
disclose them. Any perception that the physician tried to cover up
a mistake might make patients angry or more litigious.
Furthermore, the risks inherent in disclosing a mistake may be
minimized if disclosure is made promptly and openly and in a
manner that diffuses patient anger, if sincere apologies are made
and if charges for associated care are forgone.4"
This advice is echoed by a healthcare risk manager and an attorney
instructing their colleagues:
The manner in which physicians and staff deal with unintended
outcomes or adverse events ...may precipitate legal action. The
best approach is to deal with the situation with caring compassion,
explaining to the patient what occurred without placing blame on
others and what treatment, if any, is required to address the event.

41

Amy B. Witman, M.D. et al., How Do Patients Want Physiciansto Handle Mistakes? A
Survey of Internal Medicine Patientsin an Academic Setting, 156 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2565
(1996).42
Quoted in Diverse Groups,supra note 231 at 2.

MEDICAL ERRORS vs. MALPRACTICE

1997]

Patients generally appreciate the truth and vill only become3
suspicious if they are avoided or their questions are not answered.
A former president of the American College of Legal Medicine cites
as a "typical complaint" of patients who consult with legal counsel about
filing malpractice claims:
I never got a satisfactory explanation about the problem that
occurred. (There is a tendency to avoid such discussions. Often,
physicians who should discuss a problem with a patient send in a
resident who does not want to say the wrong thing and does not
have the experience or knowledge to kmow what is correct to
say...).'
He admonishes: "When there is a death or misadventure, the responsible
party should provide the explanation. There is no excuse for violation of
this mandate." 45
Stephen Fielding, a sociologist who has studied the etiology of
medical malpractice notes:
Good communications and patient relations help keep patients and
their families informed about maloccurrences. Many claimants
file suits in order to learn the facts about what actually happened
and to make the provider(s) accountable. The claimants I
interviewed often spoke of getting inadequate information or of
feeling as though there had been a cover-up. Several claimants
told me that they might not have sued if their physicians had told

43
Deborah Korlinski & Ellen E. McLaughlin, Eniployment/Physician Issues, in
PROcEEDINGs OF SIXTH ANNUAL SY iosmIMOFHEALTHcAREATONEys AND RISK MAN/AGERS,

287-309, Feb. 6-7, 1997 (AHA ed. 1997). Unfortunately, legal advice on this point frequently is
more ambiguous. One physician describes a discussion within a hospital ethics committee about
advising a patient's family that there has been a medical error, "We turned to the lawyers, who
shrugged and said that whatever we did, we should be sure to document it well. Truth telling is

best, someone said. Not always, another replied. We ended up a hungjury, and told the attending
that either option was acceptable." JoHN D. LANTOs, Do WE STILL NEED DOCoPs? 122 (1997).
"Lee S. Goldsmith, M.D., LL.B., A Look at the Relationships of Parties Involved in
MedicalMalpracticeLitigation ith a View Toward Helpingthe Patient, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 125,

134 (1993).

4Id., at 135.
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them exactly what had happened. Knowing how a negative

outcome occurred is critical to the process of emotional healing.4 6

Fielding continues:
Certainly, any adverse events should be explained to patients and
their families as soon as possible, and these explanations .hould be
repeated, if necessary, after the patient and his or her family have
had time to emotionally absorb what happened. Although thisflies

in the
face of legal advice, withholding information can trigger a
47
suit.

Unfortunately, Fielding is correct in the presumption that ethically
and psychologically prudent advice flies in the face of generally
promulgated risk management wisdom. The irony is compounded by the
fact that liability may be imposed on a physician specifically because that
professional failed to reveal relevant information -- i.e., the occurrence of
the medical error -- to the patient. The cause of action here could be based
on the physician's violation of fiduciary responsibilities, which encompass
obligations to disclose the nature and scope of negligently caused injuries,
to allow the patient to have those iatrogenically caused injuries properly
and timely remedied or mitigated.4" In one notorious case4", for instance,
the court held that a professional football player had been the victim of

46

Stephen L. Fielding, When PatientsFeel Ignored: Study Findings about Medical
Liability, 72 ACAD. MED. 6, 6 (1997); see also SANDRA M. GILBERT, WRONGFUL DEATH: A
MEMOIR (1995) (a wife explaining that she filed a malpractice action based on her husband's death
because she felt ignored and/or deceived by the medical professionals).
47
Fielding, supra note 46, at 7 (emphasis added); see also BERNARD LOW-4, M.D., THE LOST
ART OF HEALING 154 (1996) ("[a]dmitting error and offering a deeply felt apology clears the air.
I am not aware of a case where apology led to litigation, and I have often known such
forthrightness to bond a doctor and patient in a closer relationship of trust and friendship.").
According to a recent report of the Royal College of Physicians, entitled Improving
Communication Between Doctors and Patients,many patient complaints could be resolved by
early, frank, and open discussion, and a physician who says that he or she is sorry that a patient
has suffered is not admitting liability and should not fear possible litigation by simply expressing
sympathy. See Linda Beecham, Learningto Break Bad News, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 1502 (1997).
4
See, e.g., Theodore LeBlang & Jane L. King, Trot Liability for Nondisclosure: The
Physician'slegal Obligationsto Disclose PatientIllness and Injury, 89 DIcK. L. REv. 1 (1984);
Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physician'sDuty to DiscloseMedicalMistakes,
28 UCLA L. REV.52 (1980).
49
Krueger v. San Francisco Forty-Niners, 189 Cal. App. 3d 823, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1987).
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actionable misrepresentation When, after the player suffered a kmee injury
in a game, the team physician failed to reveal to him that the injury was
degenerative and irreversible and that continued professional play would
only worsen the condition.50
Furthermore, by fraudulently concealing the error, a physician
unintentionally may be bolstering the patient's ability to later prove the
necessary elements of damage and proximate causation in a negligence
claim. As a form of equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations in a given
jurisdiction may be tolled if the physician is found to have knowingly and
intentionally concealed the negligent act or omission from the patient."'
If knowing and intentional concealment is found, the statutory time for
filing a claim begins to run when the plaintiff discovered or should have
52
discovered the wrong.
In light of the above, in the event of a bad, or especially an
unexpected, medical outcome:
fit is therefore

highly recommended that a physician explain to the
patients reasonable satisfaction just what occurred and v-hy. If no
explanation is given, or an inadequate explanation is given this
could act to infuriate the patient further. If the patient is already
suspicious of the treatment he received, a poor or nonexistent
explanation vill only collaborative the suspicion and could
possibly be the motivation for promptly commencing a lawsuit.
Accordingly, it is not only incumbent upon the physician to
provide a meaningful explanation but also a very ase physicianpatient relationship move."5 3
For both legal and ethical reasons, the physician should attempt to
timely repair or mitigate any patient injury that has been caused by
medical error. To intervene in a corrective fashion, though, the physician
must first obtain the patient's (or surrogate's, in the case of decisionally

soId.
5'See, e.g., Detwiler v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, 8S4 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);

Simeuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1978).
52BotmaL & ELIAS, supra note 1, at 145.

"Kenneth Ness, Common Causes of MalpracticeLitigation, in I MEDICAL AND HOS'.
§ 3.21 (Miles J. Zaremski & Louis S. Goldstein eds., 1988).
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incapable patients)54 informed consent to the medical intervention." The
communication that comprises a valid informed consent process need not
always require the physician to volunteer the fact an error was made, and
certainly need not include an admission of fault on the physician's part.
Such admissions ordinarily will not change the particular patient's medical
situation. In unusual circumstances, in which knowing that an error had
occurred might affect the patient's medical well-being, a strong argument
can be made for imposing a legal obligation on the physician to disclose
that valuable and pertinent information. An even more powerful case may
be made for the physician's duty to respond truthfully to direct questions
posed by the patient.
Nevertheless, it is true that a physician's admission of error in patient
care ordinarily may be introduced in evidence as proof of the facts
admitted against the physician if a malpractice complaint subsequently is
brought. Thus, the physician's own words may be used to help satisfy the
plaintiffs burden of proof. As one law professor warns,
Because the physician seldom admits either a mistake or
malpractice, it makes it more precious for the lawyer to latch on to
any statement, where in front of third persons, in court or in his
confesses he goofrd. The
own or hospital records, the doctor
6
situation is a tabula in naufragio.0
Similarly, in many situations the fact that corrective measures were
undertaken by a defendant following an adverse event may be introduced
in evidence as proof that negligence had occurred.
When an error associated with patient injury occurs within an
institutional or organizational structure, it is probable that a written
incident report will be prepared. Incident reports used in daily operation
"4Regarding surrogate medical decision making for decisionally incapable patients, see
generally HASTINGS, supra note 15, at 116-118; Steven B, Bisbing, Psy. D., J.D., et al.,
Competency, Capacity, and Immunity, in LEGAL MEDICINE 27 (American College of Legal
Medicine ed., 3rd ed. 1995).
"SRegarding informed consent, see generally GEORGE D. POZGAR & NINAs SANTUCCI
POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 393-416 (6th ed. 1996); Barry R.
FURROV, et al., HEALTH LAW 265-288 (1995); Emidio A. Bianco & Harold L Hirsh, Consent to
and Refusal ofMedical Treatment, in LEGAL MEDICINE 274-296 (American College of Legal
Medicine ed., 3rd ed. 1995).
56
Ralph Slovenko, Commentary: "Oopsl" Admissions by Physicians, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 489, 500 (1987) (emphasis in original)..
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and primarily to improve safety conditions for the provider are generally
discoverable in civil litigation; that is, reports prepared in the course of57
ordinary business and/or for internal purposes only are discoverable.

However, incident reports prepared by a health care provider for the
specific purpose of preparing for and defending against potential future
litigation, and communicated to the provider's liability insurance carrier,

may be immune from civil discovery under the attorney/client privilege
and/or work product doctrine. 8
SOLUTIONS AND INITIATIVES
When errors occur in the delivery of medical care, everyone concerned is
a potential victim, as is the medical care delivery system itself 9

Prevalent physician apprehensions about exposure to litigation and
liability associated with the handling of medical errors sometimes are

predicated on an accurate understanding of the legal environment. More
frequently than not, though, these anxieties are based on erroneous
premises about the law and the operation of the legal system.

Nonetheless, legal perceptions are infinitely more important than reality
in shaping physician behavior toward patients. Thus, physicians' legal
anxieties serve as a powerful barrier to the implementation of a concerted
strategy to identify, prevent, mitigate, and correct those errors. We must
ask, therefore, what strategies can be devised and productively put into
place to address and overcome the current perceived legal environment
within which medical errors occur?60
"Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993) (statemcnts taken by
hospital's legal counsel where employees were not seeking legal advice re.arding their own
conduct was not privileged); Kupor v. Solito, 687 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App. 1985) (incident report
discoverable unless made in conncetion with claim or lawsuit); St. Louis Little Rock Hospital, Inc.
v. Gaertner, 6S2 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (incident report made in the course of ordinry
business is discoverable); see also White v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 88 Civ.
7536 (LBS), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXS 3008 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1990) (state confidentiality statutes
did not prevent discovery of hospital indicent reports in a civil rights lavsuit).
"Enke v. Anderson, 733 SAV.2d 462, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (incident report protected
from discovery).
"See David C. Classen et al.,Adverse DrugEvents in HospitalicdPaticnis'Erccss Lcnglh
of Stay, Extra Costs, andAttributable Mortali, 277 JAMA 301 (1997); David W. Bates et al,
The Costs ofAdverse DrugEvents in HospializedPatients,277 J.AMA 307 (1997).
6
"This is not an inquiry presently limited to the Unites States. Se, e.g., Peter Richards ct
aL, ManagingMedicalMishaps, 313 Bar. MED. J. 243 (1996) (discussing the necd for greater
openness and partnership in addressing the medical errors problem among physicians, attorneys,
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A leading expert in the field of medical errors advocates a system
modeled on the system used by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) for preventing and remedying safety problems in aircraft. Here, a
person who reports medical errors, like one who reports safety problems,
would be immune from any legal liability associated with the error
reported. 6' Another analyst has stated, "It is imperative that an atmosphere be created in which medical care personnel can freely provide data
about errors and near errors they experience., 62 This proposal is ironically
based on the theory that talking about mistakes is, ordinarily, excellent
long range risk management, because the discussion may lead to
important, needed improvements in provider practice.6" Forgiveness
encourages "help-seeking" behavior. 4 Moreover, frank and open
communication is more likely to maintain and renew than to harmfully
rupture the therapeutic relationship between the physician and patient? "
A pathbreaking conference was held in October, 1996, in Rancho
Mirage, California, on the subject of errors in health care. 66 Convened
jointly by the American Medical Association (AMA), American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), and the
Annenberg Center for Health Sciences, with financial support from
numerous other organizations, this three-day meeting brought together
national experts from the fields of medicine, law, bioethics, management,
and health services research.67 The announced goal of the meeting was to
give impetus to a process dedicated to fashioning and then implementing

judges, and patients in the United Kingdom).
61
Leape, supra note 4, at 1857; see Robert L. Helmreich, Interview: Human Error in

Aviation: Lessonsfor Health Care, 5 QUAL. CONNECTION 4 (Fall, 1996).
62
BOGNER, supra note 4, at 379.
63
John F. Christensen et al., The HeartofDark-ness: The Impact ofPerceivedMistakes on
Physicians,7 J. GEN. INTERNAL. MED. 424,430 (1992).

64BOSK,supra note 2, at 178.
65
William B. Applegate, PhysicianManagement of Patients With Adverse Outcomes, 146
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2249, 2252 (1986); see also Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient

Communication: The Relationship With MalpracticeClaimsAmong PrimaryCarePhysiciansand
Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553, 553 (1997) (Routine physician-patient communication differs in
primary care physicians with versus those without prior malpractice claims).
"Linda 0. Prager, ReducingMedical Errors,AMER. MED. NEws, Nov. 4, 1996, at 1; see
Rebecca Voelker, 'Treat Systems, Not Errors,'Experts Say, 276 JAMA 1537 (1996).
6'Prager, supra note 66.
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a major national agenda on prevention, education, and research regarding
errors in patient care.6s

As noted earlier, 69 the frequent occurrence of errors, sometimes
serious in their implications for patient safety and welfare, is a problem

that has long been recognized. The origins of medical error are
multifactorial, relating both to the individual practitioner and
organizational deficiencies. 70 A number of scattered, sporadic initiatives
to address these problems has been implimented over the years.7 ' More
recently, though, well-publicized statistical analyses 72 and individual

stories regarding lives jeopardized or diminished by health system errors,
such as the death of medical writer Betsy Lehman at the Harvard-affiliated
Dana Farber Cancer Institute in Boston in 1995, from a massive overdose

of a chemotherapy drug being used to treat her breast cancer,' have
greatly increased both public and professional acknowledgment and
concern about this matter.

Purported prophylactic and/or corrective strategies such as voluntary
(i.e., non-governmental) accreditation programs 74 and medical malpractice

tort law75 appear to be largely ineffective,

if not outright

'Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 2 - 4.
7
"Timothey Lesar et al., Factorsrelatedto Errorsin Medication Prescribing,277 JAMA
312, 312 (1997).
69

7
See, e.g., ASHP Report: ASHP Guidelines on Adverse Drug Reaction Monitoringand
Reporting, 52 AM. J. HEALTH-SYST. PHAP. 417 (1995); Top-PriorityActionsfor PreVentng
Adverse Drug Events in Hospitals: Recommendations ofan ErpertPanel, 53 AM. J. HEALTHSYST. PHAPR. 747 (1996); ASHPReport: ASHP Guidelineson PreventingMedicationErrorsin
Hospitals,50 AL J. HEALTH-SYsT. PHARM. 305 (1993); Steven K. Howard et al.,Anesthesia
CrisisResourceManagement Training: TeachingAnesthesiologiststo Handle CriticalIncidcnts,

63 AvIAT.
SPACE ENViRON. MED. 763 (1992).
72 See, e.g., PHYsiCiAN INSURERS ASSOCIAJON OF AMiRICA, ACuTE MYOCArDIAL

INFARCTION STUDY (May 1996); David W. Bates et al., Incidence and Preventabilit ofAdvorse
Events in HospitalizedPatients,8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MEDICINE 2S9 (1993).
7'Settlement Reached in Overdose Lawsuit, N.Y. TLMFS, Aug. 25, 1995, at A20.
74
For critiques of the limitations and shortcomings of the voluntary accrcditation process
in health care, such as the danger of the accrediting body becoming co-opted by the group(s)
purportedly being scrutinized. See, e.g.,. PUBLIC CnzEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, THE
FAILURE OF'PRIVATE' HoSPrrALREGULATION (July 1996); Timothy Jost, The Joint Commission

ofAccreditation ofHospitals: PrivateRegulation ofHealth Care and the PublicInterest,24 B.
C. L. REV. 835 (1983).
'For skeptical analyses of the quality assurance benefits of
tort law, see, e.g., Gary T.Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort La:,Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of
Compensationin Tort Lmv,43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39 (1994); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psycholog of
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counterproductive, in achieving their quality assurance goals.
Commenting on quality initiatives at health care institutions, Troyen
Brennan and Donald Berwick note,
The pressure of rules set by the JCAHO, the Peer Review
Organizations, and malpractice litigation had little or nothing to do
with the push for quality. Indeed, the increasing responsiveness of
regulatory agencies probably results from the efforts of the health
care organizations to adopt modem quality methods. 6
The current legal environment may even exacerbate the Quality
Assurrance problem in some cases. For instance, the reluctance of key
actors to admit, even to their colleagues, and remedy their mistakes in a
timely and honest manner is -- so they believe, at least -- "reinforced by
the American tort system ' 77 and translated into a harmful "Code of
Silence". Consequently, substantial consensus among health care leaders
that the time has arrived for a more decisive and coordinated plan of
action inspired the fall, 1996 gathering on medical error.
Among other tangible products emanating from the conference, 78 the
AMA unveiled its National Patient Safety Foundation. 79 The foundation
can best be described as:
embrac[ing] the idea that quality is the result of a continuous
process, in which the number of errors can be reduced by
understanding and examining the systems in which medical care
is delivered. The Foundation's goal is to promote a national patient

Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 115 (1993); Daniel W. Shuman, Making the World
a BetterPlace Through Tort Law? Through the TherapeuticLooking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.

HUM. RTS. 739 (1993); Daniel NV. Shuman, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Tort Law: A Limited
Subjective Standardof Care,46 SMU. L. REV. 409, 410 (1992) ("The capacity of tort law to shape
behavior ... is admittedly problematic.").
76
TIRoYENA. BRENNAN &DONALD M. BERWiCK, NEW RULES: REGULATON, MARKETS,AND
THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 316 (1996).
77Levy, supranote 18, at 39.
7"Regarding the major themes emerging from this conference, see Donald M. Berwick,
TakingAction: Leading the Reduction ofError in Health Care,5 QUALITY CONNECTIoN 1 (1996)
(summary of keynote address).
"Information may be obtained from the American Medical Association, 515 N. State Street,
Chicago, IL 60610.
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safety movement in which awareness of potential mistakes is a part
of every medical interaction and setting."

Other organizations are similarly involved in this quest."' An example is
the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management - the primary

membership organization for the risk management professionals from
whom physicians derive many of their legal perceptions. 2 In late 1996,
they established a working relationship with the National Coordinating
Council for Medical Error Reporting and Prevention."

Any successful error admission and correction strategy must directly
confront physicians' substantial anxieties associated with the National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).' Authorized by Congress as part of the

Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) of 1986,5 the NPDB is
a federal repository to collect and disseminate information concerning
adverse actions affecting health care practitioners. 6 The goal is simply to
improve the 7 process of medical peer review by providing better
information.1

More particularly, under HCQIA, hospitals and other health care
entities must report any "professional review action" adversely affecting

the clinical privileges of a physician or dentist for a period longer than

"Barbara Bolsen, Editorial, Ending the Blame Game, AM. MED. NEws, Nov. 18, 1996 at

17.
"'See, e.g., Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation, 1400 Locust Street, Pittsburgh, PA 152195166; Institute for Safe Medical Practices, 300 NV. Street Road, Warminster, PA 18973-3236;
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 135 Francis Street, Boston, MA 02215; National Council
on Patient Information and Education, Suite 810, 666 Eleventh Street, NXI., Washington, DC
20001-4542.
'Cf., Marshall B. Kapp, As Others See Us: Physicians' PerceptionsofRisk Managers,16
J. HEALTHCARE RISKMGTr. 4 (1996).

'See ASHRM Working to PreventMed Errors,ASHRM FOR.i 1 (Jan. - Feb. 1997).
4
See generally, Elisabeth Ryzen, The NationalPractitionerData Bank-- Problems and
ProposedReforms, 13 . LEGAL MED. 409 (1992).
'5Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 37S4-94
(1986) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-177, 101 Stat. 1007-1008 (1987); codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1989) with implementing regulations at 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.14
(1989)).
"For an international comparison, see Gail Daubert, NationalRepositoriesofInformation:
A Comparison of the National PractitionerData Bank in the United States and the National
ConfidentialEnquiry intoPerioperativeDeathsin the UnitedKingdom, 5 ArNALS HE,.LTH L. 227
(1996).
"7Virginia H. Hacimey, The National PractitionerData Bank A Step Toward More
Effective Peer Review, 24 . HEALTH & HOSP. L. 201 (1991).
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thirty days, as well as the relinquishment of clinical privileges by a
physician in circumstances in which the physician is under investigation

relating to professional competence or conduct, or in return for not
conducting such an investigation. Insurers must report payments on
settlements or judgments of medical malpractice claims. State medical
and dental licensing boards must report disciplinary actions. These federal
mandatory reporting obligations surpass any existing reporting
requirements under applicable state law.
Health care entities are required to request information from the

NPDB at the time a physician applies for a position on the medical staff
or for clinical privileges and at least once every two years thereafter, with
regard to any physician who is then on the medical staff or has been

granted clinical privileges. A health care entity also may request
information at other times.88 Understandably, the majority of physicians
are concerned about the possible negative impact that a blemished NPDB
dossier may exert on their individual careers,89 as health care entities
attempt to distance themselves from physicians who might expose the
institution or organization to an increased risk of vicarious and/or
corporate liability.9" The NPDB, as well as state medical boards' easing
of patient access to identifiable data about individual physicians' legal and
disciplinary histories,9 heighten physician incentives to avoid adverse
legal entanglements, thereby, preventing the sullying of their own records.

Coupled with physician perceptions that dealing straightforwardly with
medical errors increases the risk of exactly those sorts of legal
88

For descriptions of the NPDB's operation, see generally M.P. Damos, What Every
PhysicianShould Know About the NationalPractitionerDataBank, 151 ARChl. INTERNAL MED.
1708 (1991); Scott C. Pugsley, Implementing the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 23 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. LAW 42 (1990); James Robb, NationalPractitionerData Bank, 92 N.Y. ST. .
MED. 12 (1992); Ila S. Rothschild, Operation of the National PractitionerData Bank, 25 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 225 (1992).
"gSee Kathleen L. Blaner, Comment, PhysicianHeal Thysel. Because tl'e Cure, the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act, May Be Worse Than the Disease, 37 CAT- U. L. REV. 1073
(1988).
9
Regarding the potential tort liability of a health care entity for the negligence of its
physicians, see generally, FURROW, supra note 55, at cbs. 7 and 8; Robert L. Wilson, Jr.,
Respondeat Superior,in 2 MEDICAL & HosP. NEGLIGENCE §§ 19:0-19:10 (Miles J. Zaremski &
Louis S. Goldstein eds. 1988); Robert L. Wilson, Jr., CorporateNegligence of Hospital, in 2
MEDICAL & Hosp. NEGLIGENCE §§ 20:01-20:12 (Miles J. Zaremski & Louis S. Goldstein eds.
1988).
91
See, e.g., MarylandBoardEasingAccess to Data on Physicians,AM. MED NEWS, Jan. 13,
1997.
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entanglements that are recorded in the NPDB and publicly accessible state
data banks, these apprehensions present a powerful obstacle to salutary
systemic change.
A successful effort to improve the medical errors situation must
strike an acceptable balance between the rights of patients and society to
obtain information about physician performance and the legitimate
confidentiality interests of providers. As long as physicians and other
providers live in apprehension that the public, and especially plaintiffs'
attorneys, enjoy too ready access (including access through the civil
pretrial discovery process) to physician-specific NPDB, peer review, 92
licensure board, and JCAHO records, they will resist most error
improvement initiatives. At the same time, any restrictions on the valid
informational interests of particular patients and the public, generally, can
only be justified by demonstrated, significant improvements in the quality
of medical care provided to them by providers whose legal fears have been
reduced. One commentator made it clear when he stated, "There is
continuing strain between the right of doctors to fairness and
confidentiality and the right of the public to information that may be
93
essential to the informed choice of a physician."
CONCLUSION
To a certain inevitable extent, chronic unease may be the price of patient
safety. The law, as an important source of chronic unease for most
physicians and other health care providers, ought to exert a therapeutic
impact overall. 94 In the sphere of medical errors, however, it appears that

'For a strong argument in favor of broad access to hospital peer review proceedings, see
B. Abbott Goldberg, The PeerReview Privilege: A Lav in Scarch ofa Valid Policy, 10 AM. J. L.
& MED. 151 (1984); Geoffery J. Wright, Comment, Anatomy of the Conflict Bctwccn Hospital

Medical StaffPeerReview ConfidentialityandMedical MalpracticePlaintifRccoer.:A Case
for LegislativeAmendment, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 661 (1984). The confidentiality provisions

regarding the federally mandated Peer Review Organizations (PROs) are found at 42 U.S.C. §
1320c-9(a) (1994), implemented at 42 C.F.R. § 476.101 (1996).
93Norman G. Levinsky, Social, Institutional,and Economic Barriersto the Ererciseof
Patients'Rights,334 N. ENG. J. MED. 532, 533 (1996).
9On the concept that the law ought to exert a therapeutic impact on patient well-being, see,
e.g., LAW INA THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS INTHERAPEUTIC JLMISPR ETDCE (David B.
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds., 1990); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A

THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds., 1990); DAvID B. WExL ER &
BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
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physicians' chronic unease, bordering on obsession, about their own
exposure to legal liability often has threatened, rather than protected, the
welfare of their patients. The health care system's longstanding difficulty
in effectively identifying, reducing, and mitigating -- let alone eliminating
-- errors, illustrates starkly the limitations of negative reinforcement. Fear
of blame and finger-pointing at specifically identified culprits has unduly
inhibited attention to the sorts of systemic improvements that should
decrease harmful medical errors.95 To the degree that the law itself is at
fault for errors in medicine, it is time for honest re-evaluation, reflection,
and revision.

95

Cf.Jerry Avom, M.D., PutingAdverse DrugEventsInto Perspective, 277 JAMA 341,

341 (1997) (today's "industrial vision of medicine has brought with it, along with its many adverse

effects, a new way of thinkg ...: the conceptualization of health care as a collection of processes
interacting within a larger system.").

